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The history of Russian America is rich with striking events, courageous
voyages, grandiose projects, and rather modest practical results. One of the
oddest and most exotic episodes in the history of the Russian-American
Company (RAC) was the Hawaiian adventure of Dr. Schaffer. Until recently
the Russian chapter in the history of the Hawaiian Islands (or Sandwich
Islands, as they had been called in the 19th Century) remained almost
unknown to a large portion of the public. Nevertheless this subject has been
treated in specialized historical literature for over 100 years now, with a
greater or lesser degree of reliability. For example Dr. Schaffer's Hawaiian
expedition had been described at quite great length by his contemporary, and
a remote participant of the events, K. T. Khlebnikov back in 1835.1 P. A.
Tikhmenev and H. H. Bancroft wrote about it later.2 On request from the
latter, the French ethnographer A. L. Pinart gathered a valuable collection
of documents from the Russian archives in 1874.3 Unfortunately this informa-
tion remained outside the awareness of investigators, and most succeeding
authors (W. D. Alexander, N. Vishnyakov, and others) retold facts that
already were known.4
It was not until the 1930's that a new step forward was made with publica-
tion of the papers by the American professor F. A. Golder and the Soviet
scholar S. B. Okun'. Based on his earlier research in the Russian archives,
F. A. Golder's paper makes a brief examination not only of Dr. Schaffer's
actions in Hawaii but of projects proposed to the Russian Department of
Foreign Affairs at the beginning of the 1820's by A. Ljungstedt and P. Dobell
as well. As far as S. B. Okun' is concerned, in 1936 he published a number of
important documents from the holdings of the Department of Manufactures
and Internal Commerce for the first time in the pages of Krasnogo Arkhtva,
and later he analyzed them in detail in a book on the RAC (1939).5 Okun's
papers, unfortunately, promoted the unjustified thesis that G. Schaffer's
attempt at seizing the Hawaiian Islands was apparently the "execution of a
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carefully thought-out plan formulated by the RAC and approved by the
Tsarist government."6
But this thesis was supported by neither Soviet nor American investigators.
K. Mehnert noted that the postures of Schaffer, Baranov, the RAC, and the
government differed sharply from one another.7 In fact, the documents not
only did not support the thesis mentioned above, but they also evidenced a
diametrically opposed situation. The Tsarist government was not involved at
all in Dr. Schaffer's adventures from the very beginning and later it categori-
cally rejected the very idea of annexing the Hawaiian Islands to Russia.
The mentioned thesis was subjected to the most thorough and factual
criticism in the book by the Soviet investigator D. D. Tumarkin in 1964.
Although D. D. Tumarkin was not aware of the content of the instructions
given to G. Schaffer in 1815 by A. A. Baranov, the chief executive of the
Russian colonies in America, he justifiably raised doubts about the possibility
that they contained an order for seizing the Hawaiian Islands. It is in D. D.
Tumarkin's book that important documentary material stored at the AVPR
[Foreign Policy Archives of Russia] in Moscow, as well as at the TsGIA
[Central State Historical Archives] and TsGAVMF SSSR [Central State
Archives of the USSR Navy] in Leningrad are employed, and a detailed,
competent outline of Russian-Hawaiian relations in the first two decades of
the 19th Century is provided for the first time.8 But in my opinion D. D.
Tumarkin became somewhat carried away when he denied that not only the
Russian government, but the RAC as well and A. A. Baranov in particular
had any vested interest in G. Schaffer's actions.
The book written by R. Pierce, Queen's University, Canada, is the latest
major effort dealing specifically with G. Schaffer's adventures on the Hawaiian
Islands in 1815-1817. Although some American scholars had been aware of
the copies of documents made by A. Pinart in his day, and just prior to the
onset of World War II G. V. Lantzeff and S. G. Stewart translated them into
English under the guidance of Prof. R. J. Kerner, it was not until 1965 that
they were published by R. Pierce with a thorough foreword and commentary
and finally became accessible to a wide academic public.9 As a result, by the
mid 1960's the array of the most important documentary sources on this
subject had been discovered and studied.
The question naturally arises: Is there a need for returning once again to a
study of this subject ? Would this not simply be a repetition of facts already
known, and do any sort of disputable problems remain in general? Even a
brief examination of the historiography would show that we cannot harbor
any special hopes of disclosing principally new documents and facts. However,
not all aspects of Dr. Schaffer's activity in Hawaii in 1816-1817, nor the
posture of the Tsarist government and the RAC are treated adequately and
objectively. Differences in some general conclusions also exist. Finally,
perhaps the most significant fact is that not one of the previous investigators,
including the best informed, had access to all or even the most important
documentary evidence. D. D. Tumarkin was not familiar with the A. Pinart
collection in the Bancroft Library at Berkeley or with some important docu-
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ments in the Soviet archives (in particular, the extensive collection of micro-
filmed RAC documents at both the AVPR and TsGADA [USSR Central
State Archives of Ancient Documents]).10 As far as R. Pierce is concerned,
his book loses a lot of impact because of his unfamiliarity with documents
stored in the Soviet archives. Moreover, a comparison of Pierce's publication
with the original manuscripts of the A. Pinart collection at the Bancroft
Library reveals some omissions, inaccuracies, and small errors in the transla-
tion. The important documents of the early 1820's were, unfortunately, also
found to be beyond the chronological bounds of R. Pierce's work.
Although the general history of the Hawaiian Islands and of the penetration
of foreigners to the islands is well known, I must recall some of the most
important facts. At the start of the 19th Century King Kamehameha (1753-
1819), who was referred to as the Napoleon or Peter the Great of Polynesia,
became the sovereign of the entire archipelago with the exception of the two
northernmost islands, Kauai and Niihau, where his rival Kaumualii was
entrenched. Kamehameha's attempts at organizing an invasion of Kauai in
1796 and 1804 were foiled by natural calamities—first by a violent storm, and
latter by a plague epidemic. The superiority of his forces was so obvious,
however, that in 1810 Kaumualii decided to officially recognize his vassalage
and agreed to pay a modest annual tax.11
Skillfully exploiting the rivalry among foreign powers, Kamehameha
successfully upheld his independence. In 1794 the famous English sailor G.
Vancouver talked him into accepting the protection of the British king and
raising the English flag, and for greater "incontestability" of George Ill 's
rights of "sovereignty over the Sandwich Islands," he emplaced a copper
tablet with an inscription to that effect.12 The British government sensibly
rejected Vancouver's "gift." Not possessing forces of any considerable size
during the Napoleanic Wars in Europe for active expansion into the Hawaiian
Islands region, Great Britain concentrated its attention on Australia and
sections of Polynesia adjacent to it. At the same time Kamehameha united the
entire archipelago very soon after without any sort of assistance from the
British crown, and one could hardly hope to force his subordination to a
foreign power.
But it was the Americans rather than the English that had the most
considerable influence on the Hawaiian Islands. As early as the end of the
18th Century these islands had transformed into the principal base of the
enterprising Bostonians, who had established extensive intermediary trade
among Russian America, California, and China.13 John Jacob Astor, the
founder of the famous dynasty of millionaires, took an active part in profitable
trade of furs and sandalwood, for which a demand existed in Canton.14
The RAC also maintained more or less regular ties with the Hawaiian
Islands beginning in 1804. Vessels sailing around the world stopped here; in
1807 P. Slobodchikov sailed here on the small schooner Nikolai. Through
him Kamehameha sent A. A. Baranov special presents: "A helmet, and a cape
from his own shoulders."15 Dispatching an exploratory expedition on the
ship Neva at the end of 1808 with L. A. Hagemeister in command, A. A.
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Baranov ordered him "to turn first to the Sandwich Islands to obtain adequate
supplies of vital provisions, not only for the crew, but for this region as well,
if that is possible, and to linger there during the turbulent time of the year,"
and then to turn his attention "to the most important object, exploration of
islands hitherto discovered by no one" between Hawaii, Japan, and Kam-
chatka. L. A. Hagemeister accumulated information on the conditions at the
islands and on their potential significance for supplying Russian possessions
with foodstuffs. He considered it entirely possible to purchase a parcel of land
on the islands, or even to seize them, for which two ships would be sufficient.
The practical result of the expedition was the procurement of about 1,200
poods of salt, as well as a reserve of sandalwood.16 At the end of January 1815
the ship Bering was wrecked on the shores of Kauai, present there on order
from A. A. Baranov for the purchase of foodstuffs. Cast ashore, the ship
together with its cargo, which was valued at 100,000 rubles, was captured by
King Kaumualii and the local inhabitants, according to the Bering's captain,
Bennett. These were precisely the circumstances that served as the occasion
for sending Dr. G. A. Schaffer (1779-1836) to Hawaii in the fall of 1815.17
It is difficult to say what led A. A. Baranov to decide upon Dr. Schaffer.
Perhaps he felt that his specialty as a physician and a knowledge of foreign
languages might assist G. A. Schaffer in fulfilling his mission. It is more likely,
however, that there simply were no other candidates at that time in the
Russian colonies in America. The initial purposes of Schaffer's expedition
remain somewhat unclear. Upon returning to New Archangel [Sitka] in the
summer of 1815, Captain Bennett argued the necessity for dispatching an
armed expedition to the Hawaiian Islands. Two other American captains
(Smith and MacNeil) also tried to persuade A. A. Baranov of the suitability
of such a step. According to G. A. Schaffer's comments A. A. Baranov
conferred with him many times on this matter, and they decided that it would
be best to try to reach a friendly agreement with the Hawaiians.18
The instructions A. A. Baranov furnished to G. A. Schaffer at the beginning
of October 1815 ordered the doctor to gain King Kamehameha's favor and,
initially, to involve himself only with scientific research. G. A. Schaffer was
to pose the question of compensation for the damages incurred only after
that time. It was hoped that sandalwood, which had to be made ready for
the time of arrival of Russian ships, could be obtained as compensation. If
circumstances were to be favorable, Schaffer was also to gain trade privileges
and a monopoly in sandalwood export. At the same time A. A. Baranov sent
gifts, a silver medal, and a personal letter to Kamehameha, in which he raised
the question of compensation for losses connected with seizure of the Bering's
cargo and confirmed Schaffer's total authority to act as the company's repre-
sentative. A. A. Baranov also noted that Russian America and Hawaii were
the closest neighbors geographically, and therefore they should be especially
interested in establishing friendly, mutually profitable trade relations. In
addition the letter's conclusion contained a subtle threat of taking personal
action against Kaumualii, with Kamehameha's consent, if the former denied
satisfaction of the rightful demands posed to him.19
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What was in mind in this regard became clear in A. A. Baranov's instructions
to the commander of the Otkrytie [Discovery], Lieutenant I. A. Podushkin
on 15 (27 [Julian calendar]) February 1816. After all peaceful means were
exhausted, Kaumualii was to be taught a lesson and military force was to be
employed, but avoiding sacrifice of human life if possible. "In such an event,"
wrote A. A. Baranov, "the whole island of Kauai should be taken in the name
of our Sovereign Emperor of all the Russias and become a part of his
possessions."20
In taking a step of such gravity, to the extent that we can judge from
information available to us, A. A. Baranov acted on his own responsibility and
risk, counting on the old rule that no one judges the victor. However, events
unfolded in a way that no one could imagine.
In the beginning of October 1815 Dr. Schaffer left for Hawaii aboard the
American ship Isabella, arriving about a month later (7 November 1815,
Julian Calendar?). Judging from Schaffer's notes, he was forced to confront
the active opposition of Americans right from the very beginning. They
clearly feared the loss of their privileges and influence on the islands. Some
American captains or skippers, J. Ebbets, W. Hunt, and "old John Young,
who had been residing on this island for a long time as governor, and who has
a great influence on the king," assured Kamehameha and "other important
islanders" that Schaffer's arrival and "the vessels he expected to arrive soon
from New Archangel are an embodiment of the hostile intentions of the
Russians. This is why the letter and medal . . . were returned unopened."21
Dr. Schaffer was forced to display a good deal of resourcefulness in dis-
pelling the king's fears somewhat. Without a doubt his medical knowledge
was of assistance here. "I have all reason to believe that I will be successful
in gaining return of the valuable cargo, valued at close to 20,000 piasters,"
the enterprising doctor reported elatedly to the RAC Main Office on 1 January
1816. "I have already been able to win over the friendship and trust of the
great King Kamehameha, whom I am presently treating for a heart illness.
I also have been able to cure his favorite wife, Kaahumanu of a severe fever."22
Having obtained permission to set up trading stations, and receiving
parcels of land on Hawaii and Oahu, Schaffer "explored them and found
them to be highly suitable for cultivation of many items, rich in various types
of structural timber and sandalwood, water, fish, wild beech, and so on." He
"built a small house and planted tobacco, corn, melon, watermelon, pumpkin,
and other useful plants."23
Doctor Schaffer's unusual business activity as well as his interest toward
sandalwood intensified the suspicions of Americans, who started calling him
the "Russian spy," even more. Agents working for Hunt and Ebbets, accord-
ing to Schaffer, not only spread various falsehoods about him, but they even
made attempts on his life. As a result Schaffer found it more suitable to go to
Oahu, where there was more food, "and the people are better disposed
toward foreigners."24
Russian ships appeared at the shores of Oahu in May 1816—first the
Otkrytie under I. A. Podushkin's command, and then unexpectedly the
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Il'mena (W. Wadsworth, captain), which was returning from California and
called at the islands for forced repairs. A group of Aleuts headed by T.
Tarakanov was aboard the vessel. This way the enterprising doctor came to
have a considerable number of RAC employees at his disposal, and whom he
could use in carrying out his plans.
Schaffer ordered the Il'mena to remain in Honolulu, assigned Petr Kicherov
as overseer of the trading stations he had organized, and himself left for
Hawaii on the Otkrytie together with I. A. Podushkin for talks with Kame-
hameha on the Bering's cargo.25 The old king was obviously not in a hurry to
satisfy Dr. Schaffer's demands, and so he decided to sail to Kauai without
delay. On 16 (28) May 1816 the Otkrytie dropped anchor off the shore of
Kauai. The most remarkable and important part of Dr. Schaffer's Hawaiian
expedition began.
On 21 May (2 June) 1816 G. A. Schaffer apparently achieved the improbable.
In a solemn atmosphere Kaumualii—"King of the Sandwich Islands of the
Pacific Ocean, Atuvai [Kauai] and Nigau [Niihau], and Hereditary Prince of
the Islands of Ovagu [Oahu] and Mauvi [Maui]"—humbly requested "His
Majesty the Sovereign Emperor Alexander Pavlovich . . . to accept the
mentioned islands under his protection" and promised eternal allegiance to
the "Russian scepter." On that same day another agreement26 was signed, in
which Kaumualii promised not only to return the part of the Bering's cargo
that had been saved, but also to furnish the RAC with a monopoly in sandal-
wood trade. The company also received the right to institute its trading
stations and plantations on Kaumualii's domains without interference.
Losing all touch with reality, on 1 (13) July 1816 G. A. Schaffer also signed
a "secret treaty," under the conditions of which Kaumualii would provide
500 individuals for a conquest of Oahu, Lanai, Maui, Molokai, and other
islands "belonging to him and taken from him by force," and assigned overall
leadership of the expedition to the gallant doctor of medicine. "The King
provides Doctor Schaffer," the treaty read, "carte blanche for this expedition
and all assistance in constructing fortresses on all islands. As at Ganarua
(Honolulu) Harbor on the Island of Vagu (Oahu), Russian commanders will
be present in such fortresses." A special stipulation was that the RAC was to
receive from the king "one half" of Oahu, which belonged to him, as well as
"all sandalwood" on this island. Kaumualii promised to pay in sandalwood
"for all that he received and will receive such as: for weapons and amunition,
a brig or schooner, and other requisitions, and he will refrain from all trade
with citizens of the allied State [sic] of America" (that is, with the United
States). On his part, Dr. Schaffer assumed the responsibility of "setting up
trading stations and a better economy, through which the local inhabitants
might gain enlightenment and wealth."27
The main reason for G. A. Schaffer's unexpected success on Kauai was the
age-old hostility between the two Hawaiian kings. Relying on the protection
and assistance of Russia, Kaumualii schemed not only to assert his total
independence of Kamehameha, but to conquer a number of other islands
as well.
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Acting on this promise, G. A. Schaffer bought Kaumualii the schooner
Lydia and reached an agreement on the purchase of the large armed vessel
Avon, belonging to I. Whittemore, for 200,000 piasters, to be paid by A. A.
Baranov. In turn Kaumualii gave "his word as a king that beyond the three
cargoes of sandalwood, by which the king is indebted for the goods and vessel
received by the first treaty signed this year on the 21st day of May, he promises
to pay as much as possible to the Russian company for five years in succession:
Each year he is to fell sandalwood to recompense the company in lieu of any
other form of payment."28 On 6 (18) September 1816 I. Whittemore set sail
for New Archangel on the ship Avon. A. A. Baranov's son Antipatr was aboard
the ship, and Schaffer sent the original copies of the agreements made with
Kaumualii along with him.29 Desiring to inform the authorities in St. Peters-
burg of his success as quickly as possible, Doctor Schaffer dispatched copies
of the signed agreements on another American vessel to Canton and on
through Western Europe to St. Petersburg. Describing his fantastic achieve-
ments on the Hawaiian Islands in the same breath G. A. Schaffer requested
that two well-armed ships with a reliable command be sent from St. Peters-
burg. A battle frigate could be quite useful, in the opinion of the doctor, in
protecting Russian interests on the northwest shores of America.30
Giving no consideration to reality, G. A. Schaffer stirred up a hotbed of
activity on the Hawaiian Islands, mainly on Kauai. With the "graciousness"
of Kaumualii, the enterprising doctor "built several small houses for a trading
station and cultivated gardens in the Vegmeyskaya [Waimea] Valley, Atuvai
[Kauai] during a fourteen month period with the assistance of islanders
furnished by the king, and for the store, the king provided an edifice of stone;
by order of the king the chiefs of the province in which Gannarey [Hanalei]
Harbor is located ceremoniously surrendered it with its population of 30
families to Schaffer."31
G. A. Schaffer's hopes for approval of his activity on the Sandwich Islands
and, most importantly, for realistic assistance from A. A. Baranov and the
St. Petersburg authorities were not answered. The administrator of Russian
possessions in America "did not approve of and would not finance" the
purchase of the ship Avon. Having received the original copies of G. A.
Schaffer's agreements and having looked over his dispatches, A. A. Baranov
immediately wrote him that he (Baranov) "cannot approve the conditions
agreed upon by him without the permission of the Main Office," and he
forbade Schaffer from "venturing into any sort of subsequent speculations."32
At the beginning of December 1816 the brig Rurik, which had completed
a round-the-world voyage under the command of O. E. von Kotzebue appeared
off the shores of the Hawaiian Islands. Inasmuch as Schaffer had long ago
spread rumors about the imminent arrival of a Russian naval ship to act in
his aid, Kamehameha ordered a force numbering close to 400 individuals,
armed with rifles, to take positions on the shore. O. E. von Kotzebue was
able to convince the king of the friendly intentions of the Russians through
Eliot de Castro, and on 24 November (5 December) 1816 a meeting was held
between himself and Kamehameha. O. E. von Kotzebue hastened to assure
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the king that Alexander I had "absolutely no desire to take possession of the
islands."33 During his stay on the Hawaiian Islands, O. E. von Kotzebue
established the most friendly relations with the islanders, and on departure
from Honolulu on 14 (26) December 1816, "he ordered a seven-gun salute to
the fortress." Present in Hawaii with O. E. von Kotzebue, the natural historian
A. Chamisso concluded that "the Sandwich Islands will remain as they had
been previously: A free port and trading place for all navigators of these seas.
If any foreign power ventured to seize these islands, the ruination of such an
enterprise would require neither the envious watchfulness of the Americans,
who have achieved almost exclusive domain over trade on these seas, nor the
reliable protection of the English. . . . These people pay allegiance to no
foreigner; they are too strong, too numerous, and love war too much to allow
a possibility of their destruction."34
Meanwhile despite the solemn agreements made with Kaumualii, G. A.
Schaffer's position turned out to be quite complicated. As early as September
1816 the trading station on Oahu was abandoned under the threat of force,
and then American captains attempted (but in fact, without success) to lower
the Russian flag in the village of Waimea (Kauai).35 Schaffer's position became
even more complex when it came to be known that he could not count on the
support of A. A. Baranov and O. E. von Kotzebue. Employees of the RAC
reported that citizens of the United States threatened "that if King Tomari
(such was the name given to Kaumualii in the Russian documents—author)
does not hastily evict the Russians from Atuvai and does not remove the
Russian flag, he will be visited by five American vessels, and they will kill
both him [sic] and all of the Indians. Then the Americans that were in the
service of the Russians rose in revolt against the Russians. . . . There was no
way we could oppose our enemies; our forces were weak." Judging by
Schaffer's journal, this occurred on 17 (29) June 1817.36
Though tardily, G. A. Schaffer finally came to understand "that the
prescription 'retreat and run for home' is tremendously more salutory and
healthy than displaying belligerence [ratoborstvovat'] and placing a sword in
a hand accustomed to a scalpel."37 With extreme difficulty Schaffer managed
to make his way to Honolulu on a half-wrecked ship. Firing a cannon and
raising a white flag, Schaffer asked for permission to enter the harbor im-
mediately. The Russians that suffered the disaster were finally allowed into
the inner harbor nine days later, on 1 (13) July 1817.
It is difficult to say what the fate of the ill-starred conqueror of the "land
of eternal spring" might have been, had not the American ship Panther, under
the command of Captain Lewis arrived at Honolulu, who agreed to "carry
him away on his way to Canton" out of a sense of indebtedness to Schaffer for
medical assistance rendered one year before. Leaving a large group of Russians
and Aleuts on Oahu under the command of T. Tarakanov, Schaffer left the
Hawaiian Islands on 7 (19) July 1817 forever. Two persons accompanied
him—G. Izkakov, an Aleut, and F. Osipov, an employee of the company.38
This is the way the Hawaiian episode of the doctor of medicine's adventure
ended. He faced new battles before him, but their location was to be the civil
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service offices in St. Petersburg, which began to receive reports in August
1817 on the remarkable occurrences on the faraway Pacific Ocean islands.
The directors of the Russian-American Company became aware of Doctor
Schaffer's mission to the Hawaiian Islands for the first time through reports
from A. A. Baranov, received in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1817. The
initial reaction of the company's Main Office was sharply unfavorable; this is
evidence that the initiative in this whole problem had belonged completely to
A. A. Baranov. The Main Office clearly mistrusted the foreign adventurer,
emphasizing the contradictions in evaluations on G. A. Schaffer, and most
important it did not desire any sort of international complications, neither in
Hawaii nor in California. In instructions sent to A. A. Baranov on 22 March
(3 April) 1817 the company directors demanded: "If he (that is, G. A.
Schaffer—author) has ended the expedition to the Sandwich Islands assigned
to him by you . . . do not employ him for any subsequent expeditions, as he
is a foreigner, and it was not for the Russians that he accumulated all of his
acquisitions."39
The receipt of G. A. Schaffer's triumphal message from Kauai on 14 (26)
August 1817 to some degree swayed the initial opinion of the RAC directors.
Kaumualii's application for citizenship to Russia suggested a tempting future
for the company, and the Main Office was not averse to capitalizing on the
unexpected windfall for expansion of its influence to the Hawaiian Islands.
Deciding not to act independently, however, the Main Office deemed it
necessary to inform the Tsarist government of the events immediately and,
if possible, to attain its support and approval. Consequently on the following
day, 15 (27) August 1817, the company directors sent Alexander I a "most
respectful report," which informed him that "King Tomari transferred his
citizenship and that of all islands under his domain and the inhabitants
thereon to His Imperial Majesty." Schaffer's reports and "the act of King
Tomari" were being presented for "the All-Most-Gracious Emperor's
inspection." Two days later V. V. Kramer and A. I. Severin sent an approxi-
mately similar report to K. V. Nessel'rode, the head of the Department of
Foreign Affairs.40
Reports on Schaffer's activities in Hawaii also appeared in foreign news-
papers in the summer of 1817, and were accompanied by various speculations
on the nature of Russia's activity on the Pacific Ocean and in California. The
famous naval historian and geographer V. N. Berkh compiled detailed
memoirs on the Sandwich Islands, appending a letter dated 12 (24) August
1816 from I. A. Kuskov, the governor of the Ross settlement, in which G. A.
Schaffer's successes were described and Kaumualii's acceptance of Russian
citizenship was reported. The text of these notes was published without
mention of Kuskov's letter in the beginning of 1818 in the popular Russian
journal Syn Otechestva.*1
Apparently assuming that the Tsarist government's attitude toward the
report on Schaffer's successes in Hawaii would be more or less favorable
(who could reject a gift?), the RAC directors prepared the first orders for
dealing with this question. As early as in a postscript to instructions dated
63
14 (26) August 1817, Kramer hastened to report that the Main Office had
received "a most interesting and pleasant report from Dr. Schaffer on one
of the Sandwich Islands—Atuvai, concerning which on this date a message
was sent to His Majesty the Emperor, suggesting that His Majesty might find
it pleasing to dispatch some nature of directives along with the frigate
Kamchatka, which is to be leaving shortly. As far as our directions dealing
with the trading stations on the island of Atuvai are concerned, examine them
for yourself in order attached, and do not hesitate to supplement them with
any additions you see fit." In a special supplement to instructions to V. M.
Golovnin, the company board ordered him to assist in every way possible in
establishing Russian sovereignty on Kauai, and to inform the company of
the measures that would be necessary to ensure annexation of "this new and
important possession."42
The detailed "directive" to G. A. Schaffer dated 20 August (1 September)
1817 was drafted in the same spirit. The "commander of the detachment of
the Russian-American Company on the island of Atuvai" was entrusted the
responsibility of supporting Kaumualii and protecting "his people from
attacks by other strong island rulers, to the degree that local circumstances
would allow, with the exception of an attack made by some European nation
or under its influence; in this the company must not interfere until further
notice." Special attention was turned to the need for showing "respect" to
the king and avoiding differences with local inhabitants. "Under penalty of
unavoidable and severe punishment," read the "directive" of the Main Office,
"you are not to cause the islanders to suffer . . . even the most minor insults,
oppression, or seizures of their property, and especially forceful seizures of
the female sex without their reciprocal consent."43 All of these "directives"
from the Main Office are of purely moot interest, of course. By that time the
Russians had no sort of influence in Hawaii, and Doctor Schaffer himself
was on his way to Canton.
Although the RAC was officially under the authority of O. P. Kozodavlev's
Ministry of Internal Affairs, all of the main strings of the Hawaiian question
were in the hands of K. V. Nessel'rode from the very beginning. In response
to the report on the brilliant successes of Dr. Schaffer the company's Main
Office was "blessed with the receipt" of "supreme approval" from the lips
of K. V. Nessel'rode, until the reception of the original act [original'nyy akt],
and of detailed dispatches "not taking any steps." The information received
from Schaffer was also examined at a "committee of the ministers," but
"in accordance with the minutes, supremely approved on the 25th day of the
month of August," this committee ordered the Minister of Internal Affairs
to "submit the report of Dr. Schaffer to the consideration" of K. V.
Nessel'rode.44 :
Being unprepared to make any sort of decision, and fearing the possible
international complications, the Tsarist government attempted to win time
and collect more complete information. On 29 August (10 September) 1817
the chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested such information from
Kh. A.1 Liven, the Russian ambassador in London. "Prior to making a decision
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on this matter," wrote K. V. Nessel'rode, "His Majesty desired that an
attentive study be made of whether or not the islands of Kauai and Niihau
("les Isles de Otouway et de Onegau" in the original) possess universally
recognized independence, and whether or not their sovereign can sign a treaty
for acceptance of Russian allegiance. Inasmuch as more information on the
internal relations of these countries can be gathered in England than else-
where, His Imperial Majesty desired that I refer namely to Your Excellency."
In conclusion, K. V. Nessel'rode made a special note that before making "a
final decision on this question," the emperor expected to wait for receipt of
the information that Count Liven was to furnish.45
At the start of the next year, on 21 December 1817 (Julian Calendar)
Liven's response arrived in St. Petersburg with an appended detailed historical
and political survey of the Sandwich Islands, and the opinions of the ambas-
sador on their possible annexation to Russia.46 As the ambassador in London
noted, "Since the discovery of the Sandwich Islands by Captain Cook in 1778
and up to the present day they have had complete political independence."
Recognizing the "usefulness" of establishing "permanent settlements on the
Sandwich Islands for the trading relations of the Russian-American Company,"
at the same time Kh. A. Liven justifiably turned his attention to the "isolated
condition of two islands (Kauai and Niihau), which are naturally under the
threat of any sort of pretentions on the part of the "neighboring ruler"
(Dominateur voisin). The "advantages" of annexing the islands, in the
ambassador's opinion, "become even more illusory" if one considered the
envy and the intrigues that this occupation would evoke from the English and
Americans.47 In his detailed historical-political survey, Kh. A. Liven made
special note that "considering the adventurous spirit of United States sailors
and the active persistence of their trading speculations, it would not be long
before we could expect a hostile confrontation with them on the Sandwich
Islands."48
The "unreliable and critical" position of Kaumualii, who ruled Kauai and
Niihau, the extreme remoteness of the archipelago, and the dangerous rivalry
of the Americans, together with other impressions left no doubt in the fact
that Liven had ample grounds for opposing the establishment of a Russian
protectorate. Some time after the carefully thought-out opinion of the Russian
ambassador in London was received in St. Petersburg, the Main Office of the
RAC, acting in response to the company council, dispatched the original copy
of the act under which Kaumualii accepted Russian citizenship and the
original copies of other agreements signed by G. A. Schaffer to K. V.
Nessel'rode. The company executives were not averse to capitalizing on the
acquisitions of G. A. Schaffer, but they clearly did not want to accept the
onerous obligations he agreed to in regard to the conquest of other islands.49
Reporting the final decision on the Sandwich Islands to O. P. Kozodavlev,
the minister of internal affairs, on 24 February (8 March) 1818, K. V.
Nessel'rode wrote: "His Majesty the Emperor wishes to presume that the
acquisition of these islands and their voluntary acceptance of his protection
are not only without any significant benefit to Russia but, on the contrary, in
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many regards they are burdened with very weighty inconveniences. And
therefore it would be pleasing to His Majesty not to accept this act from him,
though His Majesty expresses all possible affability and desires to preserve
friendly relations with him, and that the matter be limited to establishing the
above-mentioned amicable relations and functioning to expand the American
company's [RAC] trading affairs with the Sandwich Islands to the extent
that they (the islanders) agree to this order of business." O. P. Kozodavlev
was ordered to inform the RAC of this decision and "instruct it not to deviate
from this rule." In conclusion K. V. Nessel'rode noted that "the reports
subsequently received by your eminence from Doctor Schaffer indicate to us
that his thoughtless ventures have already set the stage for unfavorable con-
sequences," and reported that the Emperor "deemed to recognize it necessary
to await further news of this subject in the future."50 In addition to the report
on Alexander I's decision, K. V. Nessel'rode sent O. P. Kozodavlev the
original copy of the notes compiled by Liven on both the Sandwich Islands
in general and the two islands in particular. "With these notes," wrote K. V.
Nessel'rode, "your eminence will be able to fully grasp all the considerations
that His Majesty chose to regard with respect to this subject."51 Thus we have
direct proof that the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, in
particular, the considerations discussed in Kh. A. Liven's notes played the
decisive role in this decision-
Alexander I's decision on the Hawaiian question was in full accord with
the conservative trend of Russia's policies in the North Pacific that the Tsarist
government strictly adhered to after 1815 in Europe and America. We are not
saying of course that the Tsarist government was not striving for expansion
in these years. However, Alexander I and K. V. Nessel'rode were cautious of
overt seizures in both the Pacific Ocean and northwest America (California
in particular). Moreover St. Petersburg clearly counted on tying the hands of
its main rival, Great Britain, in regard to the rebelling Spanish colonies in
America. Nor did the Tsarist government desire any sort of tension in its
relations with the United States, with which it was hoping to begin talks at
this time on including the USA in the Holy Alliance.
It is common knowledge that in contrast to the colonial interests of Western
European powers, which were "naval, oceanic, the colonial policies of the
Russian Empire were predominantly continental." During that time Russia's
interest in the Far East and Pacific Ocean was infinitesimal and was sub-
ordinated to the general political situation in Europe, and "the Eastern
question." "The weakness of Russian potential for colonizing transoceanic
territory," wrote Academician A. A. Guber, "was demonstrated, in particular,
by the well-known fate of Russian possessions in America and the activity of
the Russian-American Company."52
Alexander I's categorical and totally unequivocal decision, reported by
O. P. Kozodavlev to the RAC Main Office on 13 (25) March 1818,53 placed
the latter in a rather difficult position. There could be no discussion of overtly
violating the "august will." But at the same time the Main Office clearly did
not want to ignore entirely the advantages of establishing Russian influence
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on the Hawaiian Islands. As a result this question became a subject of dis-
cussion at the 26 March (7 April) 1818 meeting of the RAC council. Resolving
to execute Alexander I's decision "to the letter," at the same time the company
council proposed a number of additional steps. In particular, it asked O. P.
Kozodavlev to petition for and obtain "all-gracious consent" for presenting
Kaumualii "with a gold medal bearing the inscription 'To the King or Ruler
of the Sandwich Islands, Tomari, as a symbol of his friendship to the Russians'
which is to be given to him in the name of His Imperial Majesty with an
Anna Ribbon so that he may wear it around his neck." They also wished to
"include with this medal a gift consisting of a dirk and a karmazinnyy
[translation unknown] cloak with gold tassels and gossamer." The council
also approved the Main Office's order to A. A. Baranov to "dismiss [Dr.
Schaffer] immediately" from the Sandwich Islands, "and to find another
reliable, wise, and unpretentious person to take his place to administrate
peacefully those trade and business operations that are present there already
for the mutual benefit of the company and the islanders, and which could
continue without the least apprehensions or opposition, and to explain in
detail how he should handle the affairs; he should also be given instructions
identical to the order that already had been sent from the Company Main
Office to the manager at that island." The RAC management still continued
to hope that if conditions were favorable the trading station and land parcels
acquired by G. A. Schaffer on Kauai could be retained or, at least, they hoped
to use a communication of "exalted will" as grounds for strengthening and
expanding the company's trading contacts on the Hawaiian Islands. A reliable
company representative was ordered to report to Kaumualii that Alexander I
"leaves him in complete independent freedom, desiring only that Russian
subjects, trading and hunting as employees of the Russian-American Company
and under its flag, be received by him under the same rights of freedom, in
sincere friendship, and for mutual benefit."54
In April 1818 O. P. Kozodavlev transmitted the RAC council's views to
K. V. Nessel'rode, and in summer 1818 Alexander I conferred "the petition
of the company with his all-most-gracious blessing." On 5 (17) August 1818
D. A. Gur'yev, the minister of finance, was given instructions to "withdraw
such objects from the cabinet."55
Meanwhile news of the complete failure of Dr. Schaffer's adventures on
the Hawaiian Islands began to reach St. Petersburg. On 3 (15) August the
ship Rurik under O. E. von Kotzebue's command dropped anchor in front
of the home of Count N. P. Rumyantsev on the Neva River, having returned
from a voyage around the world in the course of which it had visited the
Hawaiian Islands twice.56 Also, the RAC Main Office received two letters
from Dr. Schaffer himself: "The 1st dated the 20th of October of last year,
1817, from Macao, stating that the Russians had been forced to abandon the
island Atuvai due to the political situation, and that he himself embarked on
his journey through the above-mentioned city and will try to arrive at St.
Petersburg as soon as possible, so as to relate a complete account to the Main
Office; and the 2nd dated the 10th of April of the present year from Rio de
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Janeiro, stating that he had arrived at this capital from Macao and is leaving
it for Russia. . . . Such messages gave the Main Office cause to think that the
abandonment of the island Atuvai occurred in response to unfavorable
incidents." O. E. von Kotzebue also confirmed this last point to the board,
"though unofficially." "By order of Count N. (Nessel'rode)" on 7 (19) August
1818 the RAC was "verbally" informed that the "original copy of the act"
under which Kaumualii accepted Russian citizenship "was not returned." As
K. V. Nessel'rode noted, the emperor felt that return of this act "could anger
this ruler" but he simultaneously emphasized the need for executing all
previous orders "that had been granted exalted will."57
The principal hero of the Hawaiian adventure, Dr. Schaffer also arrived in
Europe. At the end of July 1818 he found out from the Russian minister in
Denmark that Alexander I had left for a congress in Aachen. Without wasting
time the enterprising doctor journeyed to Berlin "to most humbly relate the
memoirs on events he experienced on the islands mentioned," and sent the
"promyschlennik" [hunter/trapper] F. Osipov, who had accompanied him,
to St. Petersburg, where he gave a thorough account to the RAC directors.58
G. A. Schaffer had no success in meeting Alexander I and entrusting him
with the "Memoirs on the Sandwich Islands." Nevertheless the persistent
doctor managed to transmit these notes to both executives of the Russian
Department of Foreign Affairs, I. A. Kapodistrii (Capodistrias) and K. V.
Nessel'rode in September 1818.59 G. A. Schaffer recommended that the
Tsarist government seize not only Kauai, but the entire archipelago as well.
"By occupying the Sandwich Islands Russia would assure itself a possibility
for being the sole fur trader of the Northwest shores and would block the
Americans from utilizing the islands, but without such occupation Russia
would lose both these islands and the Russian possessions and trade in these
parts of the world." He expressed firm conviction that Alexander I would
immediately follow his advice and "actively order that all islands be seized
with one blow, with such a military force that would be sufficient to both
guarantee Russian possession and instill respect." Interestingly enough the
brave doctor proposed his candidacy as leader of the military expedition
without batting an eye. "If it be your will, I shall accept the responsibility of
carrying out this enterprise and obtain all of these Sandwich Islands for Your
Imperial Majesty and, though I am not of the military profession, I am quite
familiar with weaponry and, moreover, I have enough experience and courage
to dedicate my life to the good of humanity and the benefit of Russia."
At the congress in Aachen, neither the emperor nor his ministers had the
time or desire to study the muddled plans of Dr. Schaffer. It was therefore
decided to put off examination of his notes until Alexander I would return
to St. Petersburg, and meanwhile to gather additional information. Trans-
mitting a copy of G. A. Schaffer's memoirs from Aachen to Russia on 1 (13)
November 1818, Count Nessel'rode asked his ministerial assistant, P. Ya.
Ubri, to collect the necessary data so that a "detailed report" could be given
to the emperor after his return to St. Petersburg.60
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Several departments and organizations (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Department of Manufactures and Internal Trade, the RAC) came to be
involved in the subsequent examination of Dr. Schaffer's proposal, as a result
of which the entire complex of questions involving Russia's policies in North-
west America and the Far East was re-analyzed anew.
In particular, a special memo "On the Sandwich Islands as seen by Dr.
Schaffer" (1819), which surveyed the preceding events and decisions, was
preserved among the papers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Count Kh. A.
Liven's opinion that annexation of Kauai and Niihau to Russia could not be
sound was mentioned again in this document. Schaffer's plans were subjected
to shattering criticism at the Department of Manufactures and Internal
Trade, to which the RAC was subordinated at that time. P. Ostrogorskiy, an
influential civil servant at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was not too trusting
of the rationality of proposals to establish cotton plantations and set up
production operations, "silk factories," and so on "on islands located on the
other hemisphere." As far as Dr. Schaffer's grandiose commercial and political
plans are concerned, they were met by the most decisive retorts on his part.
Inasmuch as "barter with the islanders" was controlled by the United States,
it, "as a neighbor of theirs that is strong at sea," wrote P. Ostrogorskiy,
"would not willfully permit any other power not possessing a navy in those
seas to establish such relations." The skeptical civil servant noted further that
occupation of Kauai, "to which even the ruler himself agreed, by vessels of
the Russian-American Company had been most unsuccessful and only
yielded dissolution of the Russian-American trading stations established there
and losses of some company property."62
To amplify the proposals suggested or, perhaps, as a response to criticism
of the memoirs furnished to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on 2 (14) March
1819 Dr. Schaffer sent it a special "appendix" in which he argued that in lieu
of occupying the Hawaiian Islands Russia would lose its "possessions on the
northwest shore of America, and the Americans of the United States would
take possession of them in short course." In Schaffer's words, the citizens of
the United States "have long been occupied with nothing more than creating
all sorts of obstacles to our enterprises in this part of the world. . . . They plot
against us in China," they are trying to "annihilate our trade between Asia
and America," and so on. "One need only glance at a map," concluded G. A.
Schaffer, "to see all the benefits that Russia could expect from occupation of
these islands, but this enterprise must be completed at the soonest possible
moment, since it already would be too late after a year's delay."63
The management of the RAC was also convinced of the expediency and
"great benefit" of annexing at least one of the Hawaiian Islands. The natural
wealth of these islands, in the opinion of the company directors, would provide
"great benefits for the trading enterprises and provisioning of our northwestern
colonies as well as Kamchatka and Okhotsk, where foodstuffs and salt are
most highly needed, and after a time both regions could be supplied with
them to excess. Just the possibility that ships sailing round the world might
recuperate at these paradisical islands by itself makes occupation of these
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islands invaluable, no others would be needed with any better amenities for
the health of people, for stocking provisions, and for complete peace." Although
the company's Main Office decided not to approve the entire content of G. A.
Schaffer's grandiose plans and doubted his ability "to master the designated
islands by force of arms," it nevertheless recommended that the government
"assign two vessels for transport and one for cover and up to ioo Russian
'promyschlennik' [hunter/trapper]" for the mission of assuring "firm settle-
ment" of Kaumualii's possessions. "The grounds for such action are most
highly favorable," noted the Main Office in its 18 (30) March 1819 "opinion."
"[They are] the presentation of the objects designated as gifts by his All-Most-
Gracious to King Tomari, the receipt of which . . . should turn his favor to
the Russians." The board felt that under favorable conditions "sights could
be set on acquiring relations at other islands as well—perhaps it might also
be possible to buy some particular island, which would be enough for the use
and prospects of the company."64 Summarizing their views in instructions to
"the chief manager of the Russian-American Colonies" L. A. Hagemeister,
dated 1 (13) April 1819, M. M. Buldakov and V. V. Kramer wrote: "By
employing peaceful means, and perhaps even by purchasing a particular
island, a paradisical berth could be acquired for Russian vessels sailing around
the world, and for increasing the number of trading contracts for our com-
mercial enterprises."65
From the point of view of the interests of the RAC and the Russian
possessions in North America and the Far East, acquisition of at least one of
the Hawaiian Islands was truly quite tempting, and many of the Main Office's
arguments appeared fully convincing. Practically speaking, however, there
was no real hope of gaining approval for these proposals from K. V. Nessel'rode
and Alexander I, especially if one considers that the company had already
received a categorical denial a year before, under much more favorable
conditions (at that time no one in St. Petersburg knew of G. A. Schaffer's
expulsion from Kauai). The Tsarist government's allegiance to the reactionary
system of the Holy Alliance and to the principles of legitimacy grew continually,
and, as in previous times, the RAC's interests were considered to be more or
less secondary.
In an information memo to Alexander I drafted in May 1819, the head of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again quoted Count Liven's well-known
opinion and gave a sharply unfavorable evaluation of Dr. Schaffer's actions.
Concluding his report on the Hawaiian question, K. V. Nessel'rode wrote:
"In regard to the petition of the company for permission to acquire a place of
permanent habitation on the mentioned islands, despite all the persuasiveness
of its arguments involving the potentials and usefulness of this proposal,
bearing in mind the most recent incidents, as well as the grounds on which it
had previously been ordered to limit its activities solely to trade relations, the
chief executive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers that even presently
there are no adequate reasons for changing the rule that had already been
adopted."66
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The proposals of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received the
complete approval of Alexander I. Reporting on the decision, K. V. Nessel'rode
wrote O. P. Kozodavlev on 24 June (6 July) 1819 that the emperor rejected
the idea of accepting Kaumualii "and the islands under his domain for citizen-
ship to the Russian empire" even "under the most favorable circumstances,"
and "presently His Imperial Majesty recognizes even less need for altering
the adopted rule, since the consequences themselves have revealed its sound-
ness, and the experiences prove how little we can hope for permanency of such
inhabitation." In regard to "the intentions of the company to try to restore
friendly relations with those islands," K. V. Nessel'rode reported that "in
approving this and wishing total success, His Imperial Majesty is sure that if
the Main Office drafts reasonable orders and carefully selects executors that
are modest and careful in their affairs, the company would stand to acquire,
with its own resources and with greater reliability, the same advantages and
benefit that it expects to receive through the unsound notion of inhabiting the
islands." Permitting the company "to employ the known gifts" to Kaumualii
"on its own discretion," at the same time the emperor demanded that it follow
only those rules that had been "explained" in K. V. Nessel'rode's communica-
tion to O. P. Kozodavlev dated "28 February of last year, 1818."67 On 15 (27)
July 1819 the Ministry of Internal Affairs informed the company's Main
Office of Alexander I's decision precisely as requested in the letter from
K. V. Nessel'rode cited above.68
Such was the St. Petersburg finale to the Hawaiian spectacular performed
by Doctor Schaffer. He cost the RAC about 200,000 rubles—a most signi-
ficant sum in those days. Presenting their opinions to the Department of
Manufactures and Internal Trade "concerning the dismissal of Doctor Schaffer
back to Germany," the RAC directors noted that he had been sent "to recover
company property, stolen at Atuvay, by methods that would be in keeping
with the interests of the company," but that instead of this he signed various
treaties with Kaumualii, bought "for him a war ship at company expense for
employment in seizing other islands . . . and even assumed the responsibility
for commanding the troops, the latter possibly being the main reason that . . .
he was expelled from Atuvay, losing all that had been started there."69 The
company's attempts at making G. A. Schaffer liable and forcing him to
compensate the loss at least partially came to naught. Schaffer himself had
no sort of assets, and on his part he flooded the Main Office with demands for
payment of his salary and traveling expenses. In the end the RAC Main Office
decided it would be best to give its approval to the doctor's "dismissal" to
Germany.70
The new "supreme commander" of Russian America, L. A. Hagemeister
also made an attempt in 1818 at least to compensate partially the losses borne
as a result of G. A. Schaffer's adventures. The instructions to I. A. Podushkin,
the captain of the Otkrytie, dated 9 (21) February 1818 stated that the "main
purpose" of his expedition to the Hawaiian Islands consisted of "receiving
payment" from Kaumualii "for the schooner and other articles left by
Schaffer." I. A. Podushkin was ordered also to convince Kamehameha that
Dr. Schaffer had "acted not in accordance with instructions given him," and
that "peace and harmony among peoples are the benevolent purposes" of
Emperor Alexander I.71
The total failure of G. A. Schaffer's adventures, the material losses, and the
entirely unequivocal decision of Alexander I were still not enough to force the
company's Main Office to reject for all time the tempting idea of strengthening
its influence on at least one of the Hawaiian Islands. In instructions signed by
company directors M. M. Buldakov, V. V. Kramer, and A. I. Severin on
12 (24) August 1819, the chief manager of the Russian colonies in America
was ordered to send a "deliberate expedition" to Kauai "without delay" in
order to sway Kaumualii with "affectionate" treatment and expensive gifts
toward establishing friendly relations "and to gain his consent for settlement
of Russians predominantly on the island Onegau [Niihau]." "It would be best
of all," wrote the St. Petersburg directors, not stopping short of blatant
violation of "His most exalted will", "if he sold that island to the company
. . . . Acquisition of that island is all the more important to the company
because it is the nearest to the colonies and, being sparsely populated, there is
less danger of conceit on the part of inhabitants." To fulfill the plan the Main
Office recommended selection of "such a person whose judgement, firmness
of character, and kind and resourceful qualities would assist in achieving the
success hoped for." "All of the above," concluded the St. Petersburg directors,
"is but an outline," and the job of "working out . . . the actual plan of action
on the Sandwich Islands in its entirety on the basis of the best. . . information
available on them and especially the will of the Monarch" was given to L. A.
Hagemeister himself.72
The naval officers replacing A. A. Baranov—L. A. Hagemeister, S. I.
Yanovskiy, and especially M. I. Murav'yev—were much more critical of the
plans for establishing Russian influence on the Hawaiian Islands and were in
no hurry at all to put the "outlines" of the Main Office into action. Indicative
of this is the fact that M. I. Murav'yev, upon receipt of a second order to
"execute" the instructions dated 12 (24) August 1819, indulged himself by
relating his conviction of the total uselessness of trade relations with the
Hawaiian Islands to St. Petersburg on 16 (28) January 1821.73
Some time later the RAC management in St. Petersburg also dropped its
own plans. On 15 (27) March 1821 M. M. Buldakov, V. V. Kramer, and A. I.
Severin gave orders that M. I. Murav'yev was to "hold on for a time" to the
gifts prescribed for Kaumualii, and they essentially recognized the Hawaiian
Islands to be predominantly the sphere of influence of American interest.74
Having studied M. I. Murav'yev's 15 (27) January report, the Main Office
expressed complete accord with the opinion "that starting trade relations with
the Sandwich Islands is not advantageous" and recommended "that all efforts
be directed toward expanding trade relations with California, especially at the
present time, in which Spanish domination in America is ebbing on both
sides of the equator: Consequently the law prohibiting foreigners to trade in
this region has lost its force."75
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By the start of the 1820's significant changes had occurred on the Hawaiian
Islands. On 8 May 1819 Kamehameha—the most outstanding Hawaiian ruler,
the founder of a united monarchy, and one of the great statesmen of his times
—died at an age of about 70. In the summer of 1821 Kamehameha's son,
Liholiho moved Kaumualii from Kauai to Oahu where from that time on he
lived as an honored prisoner, but this did not keep him from marrying
Kamehameha's widow, the famous Kaahumanu. Congratulating the new king
of the Sandwich Islands on his accession to the throne, M. I. Murav'yev
wrote: "In my country, as in all lands, your deceased sire had the reputation
of being hospitable to foreigners, thoroughly just, and considerate of theproperty
of all, and I trust that these virtues will continue to glorify you and many of
your generations to come." Together with the letter the governor of the
Russian possessions in America sent Kamehameha II gifts: "Two mirrors, and
a cup gilded within for the person who is dearest of all to you."76
In 1820 an agent from the American Consulate and the first group of
missionaries arrived in Hawaii. Sandalwood traders, and later American
whalers witnessed increasing business. "The political relations of the people
and king," reported M. I. Murav'yev to St. Petersburg on 15 (27) January
1822, "remain as before; the king squanders, the people suffer, and the
Americans get richer, but not for long: Sandalwood is becoming more difficult
to get by the hour and, consequently, its price is going up. . . . Some
Americans (Davis for example) have been living there over 15 years. . . . They
have great faculty in recognizing local situations and in carrying on their
trade relations, but if an outsider would desire to purchase something there
without benefit to them, surely he would be robbed and cheated." The
general conclusion to which the governor of Russian possessions in America
came was entirely unequivocal: "In truth I do not know how the Sandwich
Islands could be useful to us, especially under the present circumstances.
Schaffer performed a humorous comedy for which the company payed very
dearly, and I do not think that it could be resumed. But there is no obstacle
whatsoever, nor can there be any, simply to finding a berth there while enroute
and replenishing the stocks with fresh provisions."77 According to P. A.
Tikhmenev the company's subsequent ties with the Hawaiian Islands were
limited to "the procurement of foodstuffs, and especially salt, when con-
venient."78 From time to time the "land of eternal spring" was visited by
Russian round-the-world expeditions, the participants of which invariably
remarked on the kindness of the local inhabitants.
Igor V. Vorobyoff is a former Kauai resident and translator for the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce.
Catherine Stauder, researcher, Kauai Museum, paid for this translation and made it
available to the Hawaiian Journal of History.
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